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Abstract 
With the rapid evolution of Internet technologies and 
the popularization of smart technologies, various two-
sided markets have sprung up in different fields. Due 
to its special network externalities and the huge impact 
on traditional markets, two-sided markets have aroused 
great concern of academics to the two-sided market 
theory. In recent years, many scholars in the field of 
operations management also turn their attention to two-
sided platforms. The research on operations management 
strategies for two-sided platforms needs to incorporate 
multidisciplinary theories rather than relying solely on 
research in a single discipline such as economics. As one 
of the main strategies of operations management, pricing 
in two-sided market becomes a mainstream research 
issue. Based on the development of two-sided market 
theory, this article reviews the studies on two-sided 
market in operations management in recent years, from 
the perspective of whether the two sides enter the market 
simultaneously.
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INTRODUCTION
The classic two-sided markets are comprised of video 
games market, search engine, operating systems, portals, 
newspapers and magazines, television networks, credit 
card networks, shopping malls, home agencies, social 
media, etc. These markets provide a wealth of case support 
for early theoretical research on two-sided market. After 
more than a decade of development of the Internet and 
smart technologies, the Internet-based service industry 
continues to emerge. In the communications industry, 
Apple Inc., in conjunction with the release of first-
generation smartphones, first set up an application store, 
which connects application developers and customers, 
to further develop a platform-centric two-sided market. 
Since then, Samsung, Huawei and other communications 
industry giants have followed the example of Apple to 
build their own application platform. In the e-commerce 
industry, Amazon gradually transformed itself from an 
initial retailer model to a hybrid model consisting of 
a retailer model and a platform model, which include 
two typical models of this industry. In tourism, Airbnb 
matches the supply of private space to the demand of 
travelers, creating a two-sided market for online rental 
deals. In the field of transportation, the intelligent 
travel platforms such as Uber and DiDi founded a few 
years ago and the bike sharing platforms represented 
by Mobike and OFO founded recently are constantly 
changing our traveling mode. In catering industry, the 
takeaway booking platforms offer great convenience to 
lives. In addition, the new online market formats such 
as crowdfunding platforms, online auction platforms 
and lending platforms have also provided abundant soil 
for the study of two-sided market theory. In this paper, 
we mainly review the application of two-sided market 
theory in the field of operations management from the 
perspective of two-sided market pricing strategy.
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1. THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 
TWO-SIDED MARKETS
What is the two-sided market? Two-sided market related 
studies began to emerge around 2003, and early scholars 
gave the definition of a two-sided market from different 
perspectives. From a transactional perspective, Rochet 
and Tirole (2004) roughly defines it as a market where 
transactions between end users can be traded on one or 
more platforms; from the price allocation perspective, 
it is defined as a market where the number of users 
“on board” is not only related to the price level of the 
platform (i.e., the sum of the prices charged to two sides 
users), but also to the to the price structure (i.e., the two 
sides allocation of price levels); from the perspective 
of transactional externalities, in a two-sided market, 
the trading volume on the platform would be affected 
by charging more fees on one side and simultaneously 
charging the same amount less on the other side. In other 
words, the platform “brings both sides on board” by 
coordinating the price structure. However, the concept of 
these definitions is questioned by Hagiu (2007). Rochet 
and Tirole (2004) indicate whether a market is two-sided 
or not depends on whether the market satisfies certain 
conditions. In short, this definition is a 0-1 choice. Hagiu 
(2007) argues that the two-sidedness relies on the division 
of control between sellers and intermediaries, including 
the control over pricing, advertising, distribution and 
bundling decisions, rather than on the effects of the 
pricing structure chosen by the intermediary, as is the 
case with the definition proposed by Rochet and Tirole 
(2004). In short, there is a continuum of intermediary 
types between a pure merchant and a pure two-sided 
platform, which is not a 0-1 choice. Rochet and Tirole 
(2003) also gives a rough definition from the perspective 
of externality, they believe that two-sided market needs 
to meet two conditions: firstly, two sides interact through 
the platform or intermediary; secondly, the decision of 
one side will affect the number of the other side, typically 
by exerting influence through externalities.
Two-sided market theory is closely related to network 
externalities theory and multi-product pricing theory. The 
origin of this theory is to solve the problem that one side 
user’s welfare will be affected by the network externalities 
brought by the other side users on the platform when 
transacting on the platform, but this externality has 
not been internalized. Indeed, the research on two-
sided market could be seen as a subset of the research 
on network effects in a technical sense. However, two-
sided market study concentrates on the intermediary’s 
or platform’s actions, particularly pricing strategies, 
while papers on network effects focus on user adoption 
and optimal network size (Rysman, 2009). In two-sided 
market, generally, buyers and sellers trade through the 
platform. In a monopoly market, for a certain transaction, 
from the platform’s perspective, in order to maximize its 
own profit, it is necessary to set a reasonable charging 
mechanism, in most cases, including membership fee (i.e., 
access fee or lump-sum fee) and transaction cost fee (i.e., 
usage fee or per-transaction fee), or a combination of the 
two. From the seller’s perspective, when pursuing high 
returns, in addition to considering the costs, it is necessary 
to consider the network externalities brought by buyers 
(inter-group externalities) and the externalities caused by 
sellers’ competition (intra-group externalities). From the 
buyer’s perspective, in pursuit of utility maximization, 
they not only have to consider the transaction costs, but 
also need to consider the network externalities brought 
by sellers and buyers interaction. Finally, the interactions 
of the three jointly determine the market equilibrium. In 
a competitive market, buyers and sellers face the choice 
between single-homing and multi-homing to multiple 
competing platforms. The former means that users can 
only use a single platform, the latter means that users are 
free to choose affiliation. 
2. TWO SIDES ENTER THE MARKET 
SIMULTANEOUSLY
The classic literature of two-sided market theory has 
conducted a wealth of research on the pricing mechanism 
and tactics of two market structures, including monopoly 
and oligopoly. The basic assumptions include that the 
market structure is monopoly or oligopoly, the users are 
single-homing or multi-homing, the platform charges two-
stage fees or only one type of fee, and the inter-group 
externality or the intro-group externality is considered, etc. 
These studies make different combinations of these basic 
assumptions to form different sets of basic assumptions 
under specific market conditions. Rochet and Tirole (2003) 
consider the platform’s pricing strategy for two sides 
in monopoly and oligopoly market, respectively. They 
assume that the platform only charges transaction fees 
for users. In competitive markets, the sellers are single-
homing while the buyers are multi-homing. Without 
considering intro-group externality, they establish classic 
two-sided market pricing model, which shows that the 
price level is determined by the price elasticity of demand. 
Combined with the research of Rochet et al., Armstrong’s 
study focuses on the pricing of duopoly competition in 
two-sided market. Armstrong and Wright (2004) assume 
that the platform charges transaction fee for users, and 
construct a “competitive bottlenecks” transaction structure 
by restricting the seller’s multi-homing affiliation and 
the buyer’s single-homing affiliation. In this paper, they 
introduce the classic Hoteling model (Hotelling, 1990) 
to characterize the heterogeneity among buyer (i.e., the 
transaction cost per buyer), which has been extensively 
used in the research of competition platforms in two-
sided market. They indicate that in market equilibrium, 
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the platforms mainly compete for buyers by offering them 
a price that is below cost aiming to increase network 
externalities and attract more seller users. Although 
platforms make a loss on buyers, they recover from sellers 
who want to reach buyers. After a preliminary study of the 
structure, aiming to maximize the profits of the platform, 
Armstrong (2006) analyzed the pricing strategies and 
market equilibriums under three market structures, 
including monopoly platform, competing platforms 
where each user must choose to join a single platform 
and “competitive bottlenecks” where one group wishes 
to join all platforms, more comprehensively, from three 
aspects: the relative sizes of externalities, charge forms, 
and affiliations. This research draws the following several 
important conclusions: (i) Positive cross-group network 
externalities act to intensify competition and reduce 
platform profits, they create a downward pressure on the 
prices on both sides compared to the case without cross-
group network externalities. The platforms can increase 
their profits by charging per-transaction fee. (ii) The 
main difference between two charge forms is that cross-
group network externalities are weaker with transaction 
fee. However, the distinction between two forms matters 
only in competing market instead of monopoly platform. 
(iii) The platforms have monopoly power over providing 
access to single-homing users for the multi-homing side, 
which leads to high prices being charged to the multi-
homing side. In fact, in order to increase the possibility 
of successful transactions, there are incentives to use 
different platforms for multi-homing side, but due to the 
high price, most users on this side can not afford multi-
homing choice, resulting too few users on this side. In 
addition, in these models, Armstrong (2006) assumes that 
users are homogeneous, profit in equilibrium corresponds 
to a series of different combinations of membership 
fees and transaction fees. That is to say, the same profit 
may correspond to different price structures which are 
related to different scales of the platform. Therefore, it 
is a rational decision to choose the combination of price 
structure which can expand the scale. Reisinger (2014) 
expands the above research by assuming that users on 
two sides are heterogeneous and indicates that profit 
in equilibrium corresponds to the only combination 
of membership fees and transaction fees. It is worth 
noting that the above studies do not take into account the 
interaction within the group, i.e., intra-group externality. 
Li et al. (2010) study the pricing of duopoly competition 
in two-sided market, considering both inter-group and 
intra-group externalities. Under the assumptions that 
users are single-homing, the membership fees are charged 
to the sellers and the buyers are not charged, they show 
that when the buyer’s homogeneity is high, the relative 
profits of one platform will increase when the inter-group 
and intra-group externalities increase, this unfavorable 
situation can be reversed by increasing the differentiation 
between platforms. 
Hagiu carried out a large number of outstanding 
expansion studies based on the earlier studies in the two-
sided market. He conducted cross-cutting studies on two-
sided market theory and multidisciplinary theory and 
made great achievements. Hagiu (2006b) characterize a 
welfare tradeoff between two-sided open platforms and 
two-sided closed platforms connecting consumers and 
producers. He shows that the closed platforms create 
deadweight losses while partially internalizing positive 
network effects. Hagiu (2004) further supports this 
conclusion. When considering information asymmetry, for 
example, the seller knows the buyer’s price, but the buyer 
does not know the seller’s price, Hagiu and Halaburda 
(2014) show that monopoly platforms prefer facing more 
informed users, who have more demand when facing more 
price information. In contrast, competing platforms derive 
more profits when users are less informed, because more 
information intensifies price competition, which amplifies 
price reducing effect. Hagiu (2009) uses externality as 
an endogenous variable to study pricing. Hagiu (2014) 
considers not only the number of users but also their 
quality.
3. TWO SIDES ENTER THE MARKET 
SEQUENTIALLY
The above research has a common premise that users on 
both sides enter the market at the same time, or a certain 
number of users already exist in the market. These studies 
are focused on the market equilibrium, which is led by 
specific pricing mechanism. However, in the initial phase 
of the two-sided market, the biggest problem faced by the 
platform is the lack of users. The platform is attractive 
to the sellers only if there are already a certain number 
of buyers on it, and vice versa. Therefore, if the platform 
wants to attract the seller, it needs to attract the buyer to 
join first. On the contrary, if the platform wants to attract 
the buyer to join, it needs to attract the seller to join first. 
As a result, the classic “chicken & egg problem” arises. A 
“divide-and-conquer” strategy is proposed by Caillaud and 
Jullien (2003) to solve this problem, that is, to subsidize 
users on side 1 first, users on side 2 will be attracted to the 
platform after users on side 1 reaches a certain number. 
At this point, the platform has the ability to charge users 
on side 2 transaction fees or membership fees to recover 
the cost of subsidies. The biggest problem with this 
approach is that a big up-front investment in the previous 
period is needed, which is accompanied by a great risk. 
Most start-up companies adopting such strategies draw 
support from market financing to obtain funding sources. 
However, companies have great uncertainty about access 
to finance. Hagiu and Eisenmann (2007) study the way 
Google launches and propose a two-stage approach to 
reduce investment risk. In the first stage, a company tries 
to sell products to customers on just on side of a potential 
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two-sided platform, these products’ value to the side does 
not depend on the other side, platform plays the role of 
supplier in this stage. Once building a big base of users 
on the first side, it can target the second side, by bringing 
new functionality to existing products, which introduces 
externalities at the same time. They also suggest that 
acquiring a company that offers similar services or 
products is another way to accumulate users, but adequate 
funding is the premise of this approach. However, not 
all two-sided platforms need big up-front investment 
to accumulate users. In the video game industry, game 
console manufacturers contract with game developers 
before launching the game consoles. In order to reduce 
developer’s concerns, game console manufacturers 
may make price commitments to share the risk of game 
development. Therefore, price commitments can increase 
the likelihood of the sellers joining the platform. Hagiu 
(2006a) studied the pricing problem in two-sided market 
with the existence of price commitments. He assumes 
that the platform charges two-stage fees and sellers enter 
the market earlier than buyers. In addition, the sellers 
are multi-homing while the buyers are single-homing. 
He shows that a monopoly platform prefers not to make 
price commitments for sellers when facing unfavorable 
seller expectations, which mean that each individual 
seller expects no seller will support the platform. With 
competing platforms, price commitment makes the choice 
of single-homing affiliation less likely for sellers, while it 
has no impact on multi-homing choice. 
Based on this stream of literature on the platform 
launch mechanism, Hagiu studies a series of micro-
factors that influence the pricing. Hagiu and Jullien 
(2011) study the incentives for an information platform 
who enables buyers to search affiliated sellers. They 
assume that buyers enter the market after sellers. They 
show that the incentives for diverting search include: 
(i) buyers do not internalize all the externalities that 
their search activities generate before trading; (ii) divert 
search will help the platform to strategically charge 
sellers. The divert search can be replaced by charging 
buyers access fees and making price commitments 
for them. Hagiu and Jullien (2014) further study the 
relationship between divert the search and the degree of 
platform competition. They show that the equilibrium 
levels of search diversion are lower in competitive 
market than in monopoly market when the intensity of 
competition is high. Competing platforms induce more 
search diversion than a monopolist when competition 
is mild. In addition to this relatively new means of 
operation, the relationship between pricing strategies 
and the first-party content, which is closely related to 
the establishment of the platform, has not been studied. 
Hagiu and Spulber (2013) fills this gap. They study 
platform’s pricing strategies under the conditions that 
first-hand content is complementary to seller-provided 
content or they can replace each other, considering 
favorable/unfavorable expectations. Hagiu and Lee 
(2011) show that single-homing affiliation will be a 
dominant decision for content providers if they sell their 
content outright and relinquish control to the platforms. 
On the other hand, if content providers maintain control, 
multihoming is sustainable in equilibrium. 
There is no doubt that there are huge network 
externalities in two-sided markets. Two-sided markets in 
many industries are moving toward the winner-take-all 
situation. However, in some two-sided markets, several 
platforms coexist in market equilibriums. There are two 
reasons for this situation: the platforms offer differentiated 
services by themselves, or sellers help differentiate 
platforms by providing complementary products (Rysman, 
2009). In addition, some platforms such as Amazon sell 
some products as distributors, while other products are 
traded directly with the buyers through the sellers on the 
platforms. Naturally we will ask when the platform should 
adopt the intermediary mode and when the platform 
should adopt the dealer mode? Yoo et al. (2002) study the 
decision-making problem between trading through the 
traditional channel and through two-sided platforms. They 
roughly conclude that the optimal prices charged by the 
platform to users on both sides are related to the intensity 
of network externalities and switching cost, and the choice 
of two channels depends on actual situations. Hagiu (2007) 
studies some main factors affecting the platform’s choice of 
merchant mode or two-sided platform mode and shows that 
platform in merchant mode gets higher profits when there 
are intensive network externalities and products offered 
by sellers are highly complementary. On the other hand, 
platform in two-sided platform mode gets higher profits 
when the seller’s investment in quality is more important 
and there is product quality information asymmetry. Based 
on this research, Hagiu and Wright (2015) further explore 
the issue of how to position the platform between the 
reseller mode and the marketplace mode. They show that 
in monopoly market, if platform in the reseller mode has 
cost advantages, the marketplace mode should be adopted 
for long-tail products; on the contrary, if platform in the 
reseller mode has cost disadvantages, the marketplace 
mode should be adopted for short-tail products. This result 
happens to explain that Amazon adopts reseller mode for 
hot products and adopts two-sided platform mode for 
niche products.
4. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS IN 
TWO-SIDED MARKET
The continuous improvement of the theoretical framework 
of two-sided market theory has made it possible to serve 
as a basic tool to help researchers study various problems 
in more and more subdivision areas. Bae and Kwon 
(2008) investigate the interaction between athletes and 
fans in professional sports leagues. Gans (2011) studies 
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the mobile application stores’ pricing mechanisms for 
apps. Ehrlich and Greiner (2013) studies the media’s 
pricing strategy for online and offline multi-dimensional 
sales of content and advertising. Yu et al. (2015) study the 
investment strategy in the Promotion of Electric Vehicles. 
There are also a large number of pricing research on two-
sided platform in the credit card industry (Bedre-Defolie 
and Calvano, 2013; Chakravorti and Roson, 2006; Wang, 
2016). Wang et al. (2016) focus on online taxi pricing 
issues. Kind et al. (2016) study TV distributor pricing 
issues. Kim (2016) studies the legal to restrict the abuse of 
power by monopoly media platforms.
Future research on two-sided market may have the 
following directions: (i) The related research on pricing 
in two-sided market will gradually expand to specific 
industries, and explore the law more closely linked with 
the real market in different areas. (ii) From the above 
review, we can also find that theoretical research on two-
sided platform in set-up stage is scarce, and most of 
the models are based on the assumption that both sides 
enter the market simultaneously. In practice, the time 
points for two sides to enter are often inconsistent. The 
characterization of the unsynchronized and random entry 
process is more difficult but more practical. (iii) In the 
case of asymmetric information or in the presence of 
fraud, for example, some sellers in Amazon create false 
ratings and fake logistics information, buyers can not 
accurately estimate the benefits of network externalities. 
The impact of information asymmetry on platform pricing 
and platform competition will become a new research 
issue. (iv) Most studies assume that the utility function 
is a linear function of the number of users, some utility 
function variables come from parameter estimation. In 
real markets, the relationship is likely to be non-linear, 
and the overlapping of various estimated variables 
may mask some of the counterintuitive facts. (v) The 
general assumption in most studies is that users on one 
side of the platform may trade with each user on the 
other side. However, trading process on the platform is 
essentially a dynamic matching process, which will bring 
trading friction, instead of perfect matches. When the 
matching friction strength is large, there may be different 
conclusions after solving the problem.
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